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Abstract. Grim-trigger strategies are a fundamental mechanism for
sustaining equilibria in iterated games: The players cooperate along an
agreed path, and as soon as one player deviates, the others form a coali-
tion to play him down to his minmax level. A precondition to triggering
such a strategy is that the identity of the deviating player becomes
common knowledge among the other players. This can be difficult or
impossible to attain in games where the information structure allows
only imperfect monitoring of the played actions or of the global state.
We study the problem of synthesising finite-state strategies for de-
tecting the deviator from an agreed strategy profile in games played on
finite graphs with different information structures. We show that the
problem is undecidable in the general case where the global state cannot
be monitored. On the other hand, we prove that under perfect monitor-
ing of the global state and imperfect monitoring of actions, the problem
becomes decidable, and we present an effective synthesis procedure that
covers infinitely repeated games with private monitoring.
1. Introduction
In social situations, a queue acts in a self-stabilising manner: when anyone
tries to jump the queue, the others give him a dirty look, and often this
suffices to enforce the rule. Distributed protocols are often designed to
be self-stabilising in a similar sense: when a fault occurs, it is detected
and isolated, and the system recovers to a state in such a way that the
computation can proceed.
In general, the design of such systems assumes that all processes cooperate
and coordinate their actions towards achieving the system goals. When a
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process deviates from the protocol (perhaps due to faults), the system needs
to detect it and recover from the situation. Usually, if such deviation occurs
in an isolated one-off manner, it may be hard to detect, but when they occur
repeatedly, there is the possibility of detecting the culprit(s). This idea has
been applied to intruder detection in security theory.
There are several interesting variations on this theme. One is to ask
for protocols or solutions that do not demand detection of deviators but
to merely provide resilience. Typical solutions in distributed computing
assume a bound on the number of faulty processes and provide solutions
that can tolerate that many failures. Another consideration relates to the
observational limitations of processes. In a distributed system, processes
have only a partial view of the system state, and often cannot observe all
the moves of other processes, and these may help the deviator to evade
detection successfully.
When distributed computing meets game theory, we have further inter-
esting possibilities to consider. A player may act selfishly if it maximises
her payoff, even if this means a deviation. In general the coalition may have
no way to hold a member of the coalition to act according to prior commit-
ments (dismissively labelled “cheap talk”). However, in the case of repeated
play, there can be threats and punishment to ensure that members do not
deviate. In this context, a variety of mechanisms are studied in game theory,
notable among them the grim-trigger strategies: start out co-operating, and
when any player deviates, punish for ever after. The importance of such
strategies is that they play a central role in what are referred to as Folk
theorems in game theory.
Nash equilibria provide a robust way to predict how rational players would
act offering their best responses to their beliefs about how others might
act, in situations where players differ in their knowledge of what others
might be doing. At Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally and shift to a different strategy. Folk theorems then assert that
for any Nash equilibrium outcome vector (o1, . . . , on) in an n-player infinitely
repeated game (with, say, limit average rewards), then each player i can force
the outcome oi. Conversely every “feasible” and enforceable outcome is the
outcome of some Nash equilibrium.
Interestingly, these (and many related) results depend on the ability of
players to perfectly monitor the actions of the deviator. In cases where
players’ actions may not be directly observable, special solutions are needed,
and game theorists have developed a powerful set of techniques for many
subclasses of games [9, 12, 1, 14]. Note that this situation pertains more
directly to distributed systems where processes are limited in their ability
to observe the global state and to record other processes’ actions.
In this paper, we focus on computational questions related to deviator
detection under imperfect monitoring. Can we have algorithms that de-
termine, in a game, whether the deviator’s identity be rendered common
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knowledge ? If yes, we could like to construct strategies (for the other play-
ers) to achieve this. This problem is related to solving consensus problems
on graphs with different communication topologies.
We propose a general technique based on methods from automated syn-
thesis towards achieving an epistemic objective (involving common knowl-
edge). With imperfect information, the synthesis problem is undecidable
already with simple reachability objectives. So one expects only negative
results for deviator detection as well. And indeed, deviator detection under
imperfect information of game state is in general undecidable.
However, it is interesting to note that the essence of the deviator detection
problem lies in monitoring of player actions and not necessarily game state.
Indeed, in repeated games we often have no states at all ! We show in
this paper that in such as case, the problem is tractable. The main idea is
that the problem can then be studied in the setting of coordination games
of incomplete information with finitely many states of nature. These are
systems with perfect monitoring of state, and uncertainty for a player comes
only from unobserved actions of other players. But then, these are games
with bounded initial uncertainty that can only reduce as play progresses,
and this observation leads us to an algorithmic solution.
While the main result of the paper is the assertion that deviator detec-
tion is decidable under imperfect monitoring of actions (with only a finite
amount of uncertainty about the state), we see the contribution of the pa-
per as twofold: to highlight a setting in game theory that is of interest to
distributed computing; and to illustrate the use of epistemic objectives, that
is of interest to games as well as distributed systems. We also suggest that
methods from automated synthesis may offer new ways of describing sets
of equilibrium solutions and for constructing equilibria, which could be of
technical interest for bridging game theory and distributed systems [11].
2. Games
We model distributed systems as infinite games with finitely many states.
There is a finite set I of players. We refer to a list x = (xi)i∈I with one
element xi for every player i as a profile. For any such profile, we write x−i
to denote the list (xj)i∈I,j 6=i where the component of Player i is omitted; for
element xi and a list x−i, we denote by (xi, x−i) the full profile (xi)i∈I .
Game structure. To describe the game dynamics, we fix, for each player i ∈
I, a set Ai of actions, a set Bi of observations, and a set V i of local states—
these are finite sets. We denote by A, B, and V , the set of all profiles of
actions, observations, and local states; a profile of local states is also called
global state. Now, the game form is described by its transition function
γ : V ×A→ V ×B.
The game is played in stages over infinitely many periods starting from a
designated initial state v0 ∈ V known to all players. In each period t ≥ 1,
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starting in a state vt−1, every player i chooses an action a
i
t. Then the tran-
sition γ(vt−1, at) = (bt, vt) determines the observation b
i
t received privately
by each player i, and the the global successor state vt, from which the play
proceeds to period t+ 1.
Thus, a play is an infinite sequence pi = v0a1v1a2v2 · · · ∈ V (AV )
ω follow-
ing the transitions γ(vt−1, at) = (vt, bt) for all t ≥ 1. A history is a finite
prefix v0a1v1 . . . atvt ∈ V (AV )
∗ of a play. We refer to the number of stages
played up to period t as the length of the history. The sequence of observa-
tions bi1b
i
2 . . . b
i
t received by player i along a history pi is denoted by β
i(pi).
We assume that each player i always knows his local state vi and the action
ai she is playing, that is, these data are included in her private observation
received in each round. However, she is not perfectly informed about the
local states or the actions of the other players, therefore we speak of imper-
fect monitoring. The monitoring function βi induces an indistinguishability
relation between histories and plays: pi ∼i pi′ if, and only if, βi(pi) = βi(pi′).
This is an equivalence relation between game histories; its classes are called
the information sets of player i.
A strategy for player i is a mapping si : (Bi)∗ → Ai that prescribes an
action for every observation sequence. Again, we denote by S the set of all
strategy profiles. We say that a history or a play pi follows a strategy si, if
ait+1 = s
i(βi(pit)), for all histories pit of length t ≥ 0 in pi. Likewise, a history
or play follows a profile s ∈ S, if it follows the strategy si of each player i.
The outcome out(s) of a strategy profile s is the unique play that follows it.
With the above definition of a strategy, we implicitly assume that players
have perfect recall, that is, they may record all the information acquired
along a play. Nevertheless, in certain cases, we can restrict our attention
to strategy functions computable by automata with finite memory. In this
case, we speak of finite-state strategies.
Strategy synthesis. The task of automated synthesis is to construct finite-
state strategies for solving games (presented in a finite way). Depending on
the purpose of the model, the notion of solving has different meanings.
One prominent application area in distributed systems is concerned with
synthesising coordination strategies for a coalition with common interests
against a fixed adversary—the environment, or Nature [13, 17, 8]. For this
purpose, we assume the coalition to be the set I \{0} excluding a designated
player 0. We are interested in win/lose games. The winning condition is
described as a set W of plays; a basic example are reachability winning
conditions, which consist of all plays that reach a designated set of global
states. Here, a solution is a distributed winning strategy for the coalition:
a profile s−0 such that out(s−0, r0) ∈W for all r0 ∈ S0.
The distributed synthesis problem for coordination strategies asks: for a
given game, determine whether there exists a profile of finite-state strategies
for I \ {0} that is winning against player 0. This problem is well known to
be undecidable, already for games with reachability winning conditions.
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Theorem 1 ([16]). The distributed synthesis problem is undecidable for
reachability games for two players with imperfect information against an
adversary.
If we consider non-zero sum games, where we have players with different,
possibly overlapping objectives, a standard solution concept is that of Nash
equilibrium. A theory of synthesis for such games is being developed in the
last decade [10, 5, 4]. While there are several positive results for games
of perfect information, synthesis questions are difficult in the context of
imperfect information.
In this paper, we are interested in a specific case that lies between the
approaches of distributed coordination and Nash equilibrium: synthesis of
strategies for detecting an unknown adversary—if he should arise— under
conditions of imperfect monitoring. We now proceed to define and address
this problem.
3. Deviator detection
Unlike the traditional setting concerned with temporal objectives on ac-
tions or states assumed in a play, we are interested here in epistemic objec-
tives which refer to attaining knowledge that a certain event has occurred.
For an introduction to knowledge in distributed systems, we refer to the
book of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [7, Ch. 2].
Let us fix a game γ with the usual notation. An event is a subset E
of histories in γ. The event E occurs at history pi if pi ∈ E. We say
that (the occurrence of) E is private knowledge of Player i at history pi,
if for any pi′ ∼i pi, it holds that pi′ ∈ E. Further, an event E ⊆ Ω is
common knowledge among the players of a coalition C ⊆ I at history pi if,
for every sequence of histories pi1, . . . , pik and players i1, . . . , ik ∈ C such that
pi ∼i1 pi1 ∼
i2 · · · ∼ik pik, it is the case that pik ∈ E.
Specifically, we are interested in the event that a player i has deviated
from a given play. To describe this, we define for each play pi and for every
player i ∈ I, the event Di(pi) consisting of all histories τ that disagree with
pi such that, for the first round t where the prefixes pit and τt disagree,
they differ only in the action of player i. (Since the transition function is
deterministic and the initial state is fixed, the first difference between two
histories can only occur at an action profile). Obviously, the sets Di(pi) are
suffix closed, that is, for each τ ∈ Di(pi), any prolongation history τ ′ belongs
to Di(pi) as well. Likewise, if a coalition attains common knowledge of Di(pi)
at a history τ , it attains common knowledge of Di(pi) at every prolongation
history of τ .
Now, letW be a designated set of plays in γ. A deviator detection strategy
with respect to W is a strategy profile s ∈ S such that:
(i) the outcome pi = out(s) belongs to W , and
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(ii) for each player i and every strategy ri ∈ Si, if the outcome pi′ =
out(s−i, ri) disagrees with pi, then the coalition I \{i} attains common
knowledge of Di(pi) at some history of pi′.
The synthesis problem for deviator detection is the following: given a
game γ with a target set W specified by a finite-state automaton, decide
whether there exists a finite-state strategy profile for deviator detection with
respect to W and, if so, construct one.
3.1. Deviator detection as a coordination problem. Alternatively, we
can cast the deviator detection problem as a more standard problem of
distributed synthesis with temporal objectives. Informally, this is done by
adding a new player—Nature— that can either remain silent, or at any
point take over the identity of an actual player, deviate from his intended
action, and continue playing on his behalf. The deviation of Nature takes
the game into a fresh copy associated to the corrupted player i where the
only way to win for the remaining coalition is by issuing a simultaneous
action in which they all expose the identity of i; however, if the exposure
action is not taken in consensus by all players, except for i, the game is lost.
More precisely, we transform the deviator detection game γ into a coor-
dination game γˆ against Nature—let us call it exposure game—as follows:
First, we add for each player i, actions j 6= i that allow to expose a devi-
ation by player j, that is, we set Aˆi := Ai ∪ {I \ i}; we use the shorthand
exposei to denote any action profile where the coalition I \ {i} chooses i
in consensus. Further, we involve a new player N with actions that allow
him to stay silent (by choosing ε) or to corrupt the action of any other
player, that is AN := {ε} ∪ ∪i∈IA
i. His local states are V N := {ε} ∪ I.
Moreover, we include (global) sink states ⊕ and ⊖. The observation sets
remain unchanged. The transitions of the new game γˆ follow the original
transitions as long as Nature stays silent: γˆ((v, ε), (a, ε)) = ((v′, ε), b) for
(v′, b) := γ(v, a). When Nature decides to deviate from the intended action
of a player i, his local state changes from ε to i: γˆ((v, ε), (a, ci)) = ((v′, i), b)
for ci 6= ai and (v′, b) := γ(v, (a−i, ci)); for the transitions in the game
copy where player i is corrupted, we set γˆ((v, i), (a, ci)) = ((v′, i), (a, ci))
for (v′, b) := γ(v, (a−i, ci)), and γˆ((v, i), (exposei, ci)) = ⊕; all other moves
involving exposure actions lead to ⊖. The (temporal) winning condition Wˆ
of the new game consists of the plays in W where Nature remained silent
and of the plays that reach ⊕.
We can analyse the exposure game in terms of the Knowledge of Precondi-
tions principle formulated by Moses in [15]. Once a deviation occurred, the
coalition can win only by reaching ⊕ via a simultaneous consensus action
which requires common knowledge of the identity of the deviator. Con-
versely, deviator detection strategies in γ can be readily used to win the
exposure game.
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Lemma 2. Every coordination strategy for the coalition I in the game
(γˆ, Wˆ ) against N corresponds to a deviator-detection strategy with respect
to W in γ, and vice versa.
3.2. General undecidability. The translation of deviator detection games
into coordination games shows the problem under a different angle, but it
does not bring us closer to an algorithmic solution. In the general setting
of imperfect monitoring, we obtain coordination games between multiple
players with imperfect information, for which the synthesis problem is un-
decidable, as pointed out in Theorem 1.
Indeed, it turns out that under imperfect monitoring, detecting deviators
is no easier than coordinating against an opponent to reach a target set.
Theorem 3. The synthesis problem for deviator detection strategies is un-
decidable for games with imperfect monitoring.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary coordination game γ with three players 0, 1,
and 2 where the coalition {1, 2} seeks to reach a set F of states under
imperfect monitoring. We reduce the synthesis problem for this game to
one in a deviator detection game γ′ among four players 1, 2, X and Y , in
which 1, 2 play the same role as in γ whereas X and Y both take the role
of player 0. The new game contains two disjoint copies γX , γY of γ; the
actions of Y are ignored in the former, and those of X in the latter. The
game γ′ starts in a fresh state at which it loops with a fixed action profile; the
designated set W consists only of this looping play. The actions of player 1
and 2 at this state are perfectly observable to all players, so any deviation
from the loop in W is detected instantly. In contrast, the deviations of
player X or Y generate the same (fresh) observation to 1 and 2, and they
lead to the initial state of γX and γY , respectively. These two component
games evolve in the same way with the only difference that, when switching
to a target state of F in γX , the observation X is sent to all players, whereas
the observation Y is sent when reaching F in γY .
Thus, for any deviator detection strategy s, upon deviation of either X
or Y from the initial loop, players 1 and 2 must coordinate to reach the
target set F to identify the deviator. Hence, (s1, s2) yields a solution of the
coordination problem. Conversely, any solution of the coordination problem
leads to a state in F where the deviator is revealed, so it provides a deviator
detection strategy. Since the synthesis problem for coordination problems is
undecidable, according to Theorem 1, it follows that the synthesis problem
for deviator detection strategies is also undecidable.  
4. Perfect monitoring of states
As we could see in the previous section, the algorithmic intractability of
games where the global state can be hidden from the players over an un-
bounded duration of time is preserved when we move from coordination to
the deviator detection problem. However, our setting bears two sources of
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uncertainty: the global state and the played action. In this section we con-
sider the case where the uncertainty comes only from the actions played by
the other players. Indeed, this is a generalisation of the setting of infinitely
repeated games, which can be seen as games with only one global state.
As an example, consider the following simple variant of a beeping model [6].
There are n nodes in a network represented by an undirected graph. The
nodes can communicate synchrounously. In every round, a node can either
beep or stay silent. A silent node can observe whether at least one of its
neighbour beeped. We assume that the network is commonly known, we
are interested in distributed protocols under wich some temporal condition
is ensured, e.g., no more than a quarter of the nodes beep in the same
round, and that are additionally deviator proof, in the sense that whenever
a node deviates from the protocol, the protocol followed by the remaining
nodes allows to reach a consensus on the identity of the deviator. This ques-
tion can be represented as a deviator-detection problem among n players,
each with two actions – beep or stay silent – and two observations, telling
whether any neighbour beeped or not in the current round. As the effect
of an action profile is the same in any round, the game has only one global
state. Still, the synthesis problem shows some complexity. Partly, this is
due to the structure of the observation functions encoded by the network
graph. For instance, one can observe that no deviator detection-strategy
can exists on networks that are not two-connected: Any deviation has to
be detected by at least two witnesses, and every node that is not a direct
witness needs to be finally informed via at least two disjoint paths. But the
greater challenge comes from the dynamics of communicating the identity
of the deviator: In contrast to the more traditional synthesis problems for
temporal conditions, whether a play pi is successful is not determined by the
strategic choices taken along pi itself, but also depends on the choices taken
on histories connected to pi via the player’s indistinguishability relations.
Concretely, we consider games that allow perfect monitoring of the state
in the sense that for every observation sequence βi := bi1, . . . , b
i
t received by
any player i along a history, there exists precisely one global state v that is
reachable by a history with observation βi. In other words, all histories in
an information set of a player end at the same global state. The condition
is obviously met if we include the current global state in the observation of
each player. Indeed, every finite game with perfect monitoring of the state
can be transformed effectively into one where all the players can observe the
current state.
Our main technical result establishes that, under perfect monitoring of
states, the deviator detection problem is algorithmically tractable in spite
of imperfect private monitoring of actions.
Theorem 4. The synthesis problem for deviator-detection strategies is ef-
fectively solvable for games with perfect monitoring of the state and imperfect
monitoring of actions.
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The proof relies on a more general result which states, informally, that
the synthesis problem for coordination games with a bounded amount of
uncertainty are algorithmically tractable. To formulate this more precisely,
let us fix a set I of players with their sets of actions, observations, and local
states; the set includes a designated player Nature. Consider a finite collec-
tion γ1, . . . , γn of games with perfect monitoring of the state over the fixed
action, observation and state spaces, together with a winning condition W
common to all these games. We define the sum game γ over the collection as
a game with a fresh initial node at which Nature chooses the initial node of
any of the games in the collection; no information about this move is deliv-
ered to the other players in I \{Nature}. Note that the sum γ may not allow
perfect monitoring of the state. For this sum game γ, we consider the task
to synthesise a coordination strategy for the coalition I \{Nature} to ensure
either that the outcome is either winning with respect to W or it reveals the
initial choice of Nature. That is, we require, for every play pi 6∈ W which
follows the strategy, that at some history in pi, the players attain common
knowledge about the component game that has been chosen. We call this a
revelation game over γ1, . . . , γn with condition W .
In game-theoretic terminology, the sum game constructed above is actu-
ally a game of incomplete information — the uncertainty about the global
state of the game is due to not knowing which of the finitely many compo-
nent games is being played. Nevertheless, as the component games deliver
different observations, the players may be able to recover this missing in-
formation. It turns out that this restricted form of imperfect information is
algorithmically tractable. The setting is similar to that of multi-environment
Markov decision processes studied in [18].
Theorem 5. The synthesis problem is effectively solvable for revelation
games on components with perfect monitoring of the state. Moreover, the
set of all winning strategies admits a regular representation.
The idea is to keep track of the knowledge that players have about the
index of the actual component game while the play proceeds. This knowl-
edge can be represented by epistemic structures similar to the ones used
in [2]. Here it is sufficient to consider epistemic structures on a subset of
component indices, with epistemic equivalence relations ∼i relating indices
k, k′ whenever player i considers it possible to be in component k if the
actual history is in component k′. The tracking construction associates to
each history pi a structure that is strongly connected via these relations; we
call this structure the epistemic state of pi.
Intuitively, the construction represents the actions in the original game
abstractly by their effect on the uncertainly about the component. In con-
trast to the concrete actions in the game, which can be monitored only
imperfectly, the abstract updates on the epistemic structure can be moni-
tored perfectly; the resulting game is thus solvable with standard methods
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as one with perfect information, where the winning condition asks to sat-
isfy W or to reach an epistemic structure over a singleton, representing
that the players attain common knowledge about the actual component.
The perfect-information solution yields a regular representation of the set
of winning strategies over a product alphabet of global game states and
epistemic states. In the full paper, we show that this abstraction can be
maintained by a finite-state construction and that it allows to represent a
solution whenever one exists.
To prove Theorem 4 using the result of Theorem 5, we view the devi-
ator detection problem as a revelation game. Towards this, we adapt the
exposure game constructed in Subsection 3.1 for a given deviator detection
problem γ with target set W . The exposure game (γˆ, Wˆ ) is already close
to the setting of revelation games, but there is one twist: Besides choosing
the deviator, in the exposure game Nature can also choose the period in
which to deviate. To account for this, we transform γˆ by letting Nature
pick a candidate deviator i ∈ I in the first move; this choice is hidden from
the other players. In every later round, Nature can choose to either remain
silent or to corrupt the action of player i. As a target condition for the new
game, we fix the set of all plays in the target set W where Nature remained
silent. The obtained revelation game has the same set of solutions as the
deviator detection problem at the outset.
5. Conclusion
Thus what we have here is a building block for constructing equilibria in
games based on epistemic states. We are interested primarily in the issue
of detecting a deviation from an agreed strategy profile. This task is more
specific than constructing equilibria by detecting deviations from the set of
distributed strategies that ensure a win, as done for instance, in [3]. The
crucial difference relies in the fact that, in the latter case, the deviation
events can be described by a (regular) set of game histories, while in our
setting, the notion of deviation is relative to a strategy profile that is not
fixed within the game structure. To illustrate the difference, consider the
example of a beeping model from 4 with the trival target set that contains
all possible plays. Obviously, every strategy profile is an equilibrium here,
but deviator-detection strategies remain nevertheless intricate.
Our abstraction from imperfect monitoring of actions to games with per-
fect information is fairly generic. The central clue is that if there is only a
finite amount of information hidden in the beginning of a play, and we can
decide whether the coalition can recover it. In the context of distributed
systems, there is a wide variety of situations that involve only imperfect
observation of actions, and where uncertainty about system states may be
bounded. Hence we reasonably expect that these techniques will be appli-
cable, not only for deviator detection, but in other algorithmic questions on
inferring global information in such systems.
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